Angesichts der gegenwärtigen Krisen des Kapitalismus hat das Werk von Karl Marx wieder an Aktualität gewonnen. Dieses Buch wirft grundlegende Fragen einer undogmatischen und kritischen Beschäftigung mit Marx und seinem Denken auf und stellt sie zur Diskussion. Es präsentiert internationale Forschungsansätze nach dem Scheitern der sich auf Marx berufenden politischen Regime. Aufgrund einer konsequenten Historisierung wird deutlich: Marx war durch seine Herkunft, seine Lebensstationen, sein Denken und seine politischen Aktivitäten fest im westeuropäischen Radikalismus verwurzelt. Vor diesem Hintergrund untersuchen die Beiträge (...) auch die Tragfähigkeit von Marx zur Analyse gesellschaftlicher Konstellationen im 21. Jahrhundert. Die Aufsätze behandeln exemplarisch Marx‘ ideengeschichtliche Kontexte, sein Engagement für die entstehende internationale Arbeiterbewegung, seine Kapitalismusanalyse, seine Kanonisierung und Nachwirkung. Mit Beiträgen von Heinz Bude, Axel Honneth, Jürgen Kocka, Gerd Koenen, Christina Morina, Wilfried Nippel, Jonathan Sperber, Gareth Stedman Jones u.a. • Renommierte Historiker und Sozialwissenschaftler ziehen Bilanz • Perspektiven für die Krisen des 21. Jahrhunderts. (shrink)

Das Verhältnis zwischen Kirche und säkularer Kultur steht einmal mehr in Frage. Gehören die Kunstwerke der christlichen Tradition als lebendige Quelle noch in unsere Gegenwart, oder nicht vielmehr einer Vergangenheit an, die höchstens noch von musealem Interesse ist? Ist eine intellektuelle Durchdringung des Glaubens, eine christliche, katholische/protestantische Intellektualität sinnvoll, notwendig, überhaupt möglich?

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 97 Heft: 1 Seiten: 402-404.

"eUbungen Sommersemester 1937 und Sommersemester 1944, Aufzeichnungen und Protokolle / herausgegeben von Peter von Ruckteschell"--T.p. verso.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Gott—Mensch—Natur: Der Personenbegriff in der philosophischen Anthropologie Heinrichs von Gent by Julian E. JoachimMartin PickavéJulian E. Joachim. Gott—Mensch—Natur: Der Personenbegriff in der philosophischen Anthropologie Heinrichs von Gent. Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Neue Folge, 86. Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2020. Pp. 558. Paperback, €78.00.In recent years, there has been a noticeable uptick in studies exploring medieval conceptions of personhood. One line of approach taken (...) by scholars of medieval philosophy has been to investigate the emergence of the idea of subjectivity in medieval philosophical and theological texts and to work from there toward a broader picture of medieval accounts of personhood. Alain de Libera’s as-of-yet incomplete series of books under the title Archéologie du sujet (the first volume appeared in 2007 for Vrin) exemplifies this approach. Others, such as Dominik Perler in Eine Person sein: Philosophische Debatten im Spätmittelalter (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2020), take their starting point from some uncontroversial aspects and dimensions of personhood (rationality, reflexivity, and moral agency) and pursue the various debates that ensued around these among medieval philosophers and theologians. Very few interpreters today start with what medieval authors themselves have to say about persona. This is unsurprising, given the theological context in which the term persona is discussed, and it is not clear at first sight how discussions about the persons of the Trinity can teach us anything about what medieval authors thought about human persons. The book by Joachim is an exception to this trend. The author takes his lead from the Trinitarian context and aims to move from there to a wider understanding of what Henry of Ghent (d. 1293), the most important scholastic thinker in the generation after Thomas Aquinas, thinks a person is.Apart from an extensive introduction (9–52) in which the author justifies his approach, the book consists of four very long chapters. The first chapter (53–169) does not deal with Henry of Ghent at all. Rather, it is devoted to the prominent and influential definitions of what a person is that we can find in Boethius’s treatise Contra Eutychen et Nestorium (person as “individual substance of a rational nature” [naturae rationabilis individua substantia]) and Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate (person as “incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature” [naturae intellectualis incommunicabilis existentia]). The author spends a considerable amount of space explaining how Boethius and Richard arrived at their respective definitions and how their definitions ought to be understood, and concludes with some remarks on the differences between the two accounts. In the rest of the book, the author turns to Henry of Ghent. Because Joachim holds that there are three thematic areas in Henry of Ghent that are closely connected to the notion of a person, he devotes chapters 2 through 4 to each one of those areas. Chapter 2 (170–308) deals mostly with individuation and individuality, chapter 3 with the eternity of the world and creation (309–428), and chapter 4 is organized around discussions about freedom of the will (429–505). [End Page 504]Joachim’s decision to start chapter 2 by focusing on the connection between personhood and individuality is fully justified, as Henry himself draws this connection in question 1 of article 53 of his Summa quaestionum ordinariarum. Article 53 is the closest we get to a dedicated treatment of personhood in Henry’s oeuvre, although this article is, as usual, part of a longer discussion of the Trinity. Furthermore, Joachim explores individuation and individuality in two respects: first, he is interested in pursuing what is meant by the very notion of an individual; second, he explores what, for Henry, counts as the principle or cause of individuation. A lot of ground gets covered in these pages, as the author delves into various aspects of Henry’s ontology. Although it is not always easy to follow the main line of argument, Joachim provides a lot of helpful material for understanding the various moves Henry makes in Summa, article 53. He frequently contrasts Henry’s positions with those of Thomas Aquinas, which both helps in terms of clarity and provides useful... (shrink)